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WAGE BARGAINING AND UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE
ABSTRACP
This paper looks at models of unemployment which make two
central assumptions. The first is that wages are bargained
between firms and employed workers, and that unemployment affects
the outcome only to the extent that it affects the labor market
prospects of either employed workers or of firms. The second is
that the duration of unemployment affects either the search
behavior or the skills of the unemployed, and/or the perceptions
of firms of such skills. It argues that such models may explain
riot only the evolution of European unemployment over the last two
decades -an evolution which triggered their development-, but
many of the cyclical features of labor markets in general.
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Introduction
In 1970, the European unemployment rate stood at 2.4%. In 1980, it had in-
creased to 6.2%. In 1990, it stood at 8.8%, and the forecasts are of roughly stable
unemployment and inflation over the next two years
These numbers make clear why unemployment has been the major topic of
macroeconomic research in Europe over the last two decades. For most of the
first decade, research focused on how adverse supply factors, from higher oil and
commodity prices to higher tax rates and more generous unemployment benefits,
could explain the steady rise in unemployment 2Butmost of those factors turned
favorable in the 1980's, while unemployment remained very high. Out of logical
necessity, one line of explanation became more and more appealing, quite simply
that unemployment remained high because it had been high for so long.
Two channels of persistence were examined. The first, which was first articulated
in the context of European unemployment by Bruno and Sachs [1985], and then
further explored by Dreze and others, emphasized the role of capital accumula-
tion .Along period of adverse shocks decreased capital accumulation, decreas-
ing the number of available jobs and making impossible a quick decrease in un-
employment. The second focused instead on wage bargaining, and the idea that
bargaining from a situation of low employment would not lead to a quick return
to full employment. While both channels are surely relevant, I shall devote the
lecture only to the second '.Ibelieve that there has been enough progress since
the crude initial formulations to occupy a full lecture.
I see progress as having happened in three main steps. This is only roughly his-
torically accurate and probably reflects more on my own intellectual evolution
than on that of the field. But, by associating each step with a specific conceptual
contribution, it makes for a nice, logical, presentation, and thus I shall proceed.
The first step was that taken by the so called hysteresis models. The structure of
those models is presented in Section 1. Designed specifically to explain European
unemployment in the 1980's, their theoretical structure was rather crude, and
1. These numbers are for the average of the unemployment rates of those countries which are
today in the EEC. The forecasts are June 1990 OECD forecasts (OECD 11990])
2. Sec the country studies in Bean etal. 119861.
3. See the country studies in Bean and Dreze 119901.
4. In Blanchard 11990], 1 formalize both channels, and look at the interactions between them.Unemployment 2
they covered a short distance from assumptions to conclusions. Wages were set
unilaterally by the employed workers, who cared about their employment. Thus,
the models implied, any level of employment could become the equilibrium level.
Unemployment was highly persistent, perhaps even hysteretic —with no tendency
to return to any given value over time. Those models offered a simple explanation
for persistence. But they did so in effect by assuming away any effect of unemploy-
ment on wages. Progress since has come from relaxing this assumption and seeing
what remains.
A number of models have been developed which maintain the assumption that
wages are set by bargaining between firms and employed workers. Even under
that assumption, those models point Out, unemployment is still likely to affect
bargained wages through two channels : labor market conditions determine how
easy it is for employed workers to find alternative jobs, and how easy it is for firms
to find alternative workers. Those models have clarified the role of unemploy-
ment in wage bargaining, and have shown how wage bargaining leads to persis-
tence —although not in general to hysteresis— in unemployment. The structure of
those models is presented in Section 2.
Those models also give strong hints as to why a period of sustained unemployment
may lead to more persistence. If unemployment is a poor proxy for the labor mar-
ket conditions relevant to employed workers and to firms, then unemployment
may not affect bargained wages very much. Thus, a number of authors have ex-
plored so called duration effects, the fact that the perceptions, behavior or skills
of the unemployed may be affected by the duration of their own unemployment
as well as by the state of the labor market. When these effects are at work, the
history of unemployment affects the duration distribution of unemployment, and
thus the pressure that unemployment exerts on wages. Those models can poten-
tially explain why persistence may be much higher after a period of sustained high
unemployment. Their structure is presented in Section 3.
t
1Unilateral wage setting and hysteresis.
The first models (for example Blanchard and Summers [1986]) assumed, follow-
ing a long macroeconomic tradition, that labor demand was determined unilater-
ally by firms through profit maximization given the set wage. They then assumedUnemployment 3
that the wage was set unilaterally by workers, possibly in advance of the realiza-
tion of some of the shocks affecting labor demand, an assumption also with a long
tradition, and known as the monopoly union model.
Where they differed from traditional monopoly union models was in their as-
sumption that the wage was set so as to keep the relevant menthers hip employed,
at least in expected value. To the extent that membership was closely related to
the past history of employment, the implication was that movements in employ-
ment were highly persistent.
1.1 A model
A log-linear formalization will help to show the effects introduced at each step.
I shall make no attempt to derive it from anything like explicit maximization
and bargaining, but will refer to papers which either do so, or try and come close
to doing so. I shall also abstract from a number of aspects of reality which I be-
lieve are highly relevant to the European unemployment experience, but are not
central to the conceptual points at hand. I shall ignore non competitive goods
markets, which imply the existence of surrogate —to use an expression coined by
Phelps— rather than traditional labor demand relations. I shall ignore dynamics
of labor demand. I shall finally ignore all issues of nominal wage setting, assuming
the real wage to be set in advance, thus precluding any discussion of the relation
between nominal and real variables, between inflation and unemployment .All
three would have to be reintroduced before any of the models below was taken
to the data 6
Letn and w be the logarithms of employment and the (real) wage. Let labor
demand be given by n =—w+ ,wheree stands for those unexpected shocks
to labor demand which are realized after the wage is set. These may range from
technological to input price shocks, and would in a model with nominal wage
setting also include price level shocks. The constant term is omitted and the
elasticity of demand is assumed to be unity only for notational simplicity ; were
5. I make this last simplification with mixed feelings, as I believe that one should look at the joint
behavior of unemployment, wage and price inflation. But the introduction of nominal rigidities,
and the use of expressions such as "Phillips curves" have become such red flags for many US
macroeconomists that I would rather not take on that fight here.
6. A paper which shares many of the themes of this paper, and allows for all these elements, is
the recent survey on unemployment by Nickell 119891Unemployment 4
a constant term included, or the elasticity to be different from one, the equation
for employment derived belo equation (1.1), would be unaffected.
Let membership be denoted by n, and assume that the wage, w*, is set by the
membership so as to achieve expected full employment of the members. Thus, w
is given by n =En=—w.Putting both relations together gives: n n + c
The last step is to specify membership. In many earlier macroeconomic models,
such as Fischer [1977], membership was in effect assumed to be the whole la-
bor force. In contrast, the central assumption of membership models was that
membership was closely related to current and past employment. The simplest
assumption along those lines is that membership is just equal to employment at
the time of wage setting, so that n =n(—1).This in turn implies that employ-
ment follows a random walk:
n =n(—1)+ (1.1)
To the extent that the labor force is constant, the same will apply to unemploy-
ment.
Those first models therefore explained persistence, and how short lived shocks
could have long run effects. Indeed they easily generated unit roots in unemploy-
ment, hysteresis, implying the irrelevance of the concept of a stable natural rate.
More complex specifications of the relation of membership to current past em-
ployment yielded more appealing unemployment dynamics. If membership was
taken to be largely a metaphor for unions —an interpretation strongly resisted,
but without very convincing arguments, by Blanchard and Summers—, the idea
that laid off workers would be represented in wage negotiations only For some
time, after which they would drift away and be forgotten, was plausible. And it
implied that, while a short sequence of adverse shocks did not have persistent ef-
fects on unemployment, a longer sequence would. This was an implication which
seemed to fit the European experience, where many of the unemployed had be-
come long term unemployed and thus disenfranchised, no longer represented in
wage negotiations.
1.2 An assessment
Those first models made a correct and important point, that wages are set through
bargaining not between firms and "the labor force", but rather between firms andUnemployment 5
their workers. I shall return to this point at length in the next section. Beyond
that however, they suffered from serious problems, both in their assumptions and
their implications.
Take implications first. As long as membership was only a function of current
and past employment, the models implied that changes in the labor force would
translate one for one into changes in unemployment. But, as Layard and Nickell
[1987] pointed Out, changes in the labor force do not appear to have a long run ef-
fect on unemployment. And in Europe, countries with rather different evolutions
of their labor force appeared to have roughly similar unemployment experiences.
When the wage decision was derived from an explicit optimization on the part of
membership, the outcome was not in general that expected employment was sim-
ply set equal to membership. in the model of Gottfries and Horn [1987], which
was developed independently of ours, and made more conventional assumptions
about the objective function of workers, the results and implications for persis-
tence were much less clear cut than in our paper. In Blanchard and Summers
[1986], where the objective function was cooked to deliver something close to
what we wanted in the first place, the exact result was that wages were set so
that expected employment was equal to membership plus a constant term, which
could be negative or positive. A positive constant term reflected the desire by
members to be on the safe side, the choice of a low probability of being laid off.
The constant term did not disappear when current members were assumed to
rationally take into account the implications of employment on future member-
ship and future decisions. It also remained true in union models based on median
voter assumptions. But a positive constant term, in an equation such as equation
(1.1) above, implied that employment followed a unit root process with drift, or
equivalently that unemployment eventually went to zero... This was not an ap-
pealing implication; the implications of a negative term, and forever increasing
unemployment, were hardly more appealing.
More importantly however, the models had overly strong assumptions. By as-
suming that employed workers had constant utility if laid-off, they eliminated
the pressure of unemployment on wages through that channel. By assuming that
wages were set unilaterally by workers, they eliminated any effect of unemploy-
ment through bargaining power of firms, coming from the option that firms haveUnemployment 6
of hiring the unemployed .Butboth of these channels are important, and they
have been the focus of much of the research since then.
2 Bargaining, and the role of unemployment
On the surface, the assumption that wages are the result of bargains between
firms and employed workers would appear to be largely unobjectioriable. Except
possibly when collective bargaining takes place at the national level, there is little
evidence that unions act on behalf on anybody else than employed workers, and
perhaps the recently or the temporarily laid-off. And to the extent that many
wages result from informal, one on one, bargaining between a firm and a worker,
nobody would argue that workers act in such negotiations on behalf on anybody
but themselves.
Appearances may however be deceiving, First, for both sides to affect the out-
come, both must have bargaining power. For a firm to affect the bargained wage,
its workers must find it costly to find alternative employment. Symmetrically, for
employed workers to affect bargained wages, it must be costly for firms to find
alternative workers. The presence of such costs is however not much of an issue.
At a minimum, it takes time and effort for both firms and workers to find accept-
able alternatives. There are also often additional hiring and firing costs, either for
technological or for institutional reasons. And, as Lindbeck and Snower [19881 in
particular have emphasized, turnover costs to firms may be larger when employed
workers act in concert, threatening for example harassment of new workers, thus
leading to larger costs to firms under explicit or implicit collective bargaining.
Second, even if employed workers have bargaining power and thus can extract
some rents, the question arises of why firms don't extract the present value of
those rents when they hire those workers, and thus before the workers have any
bargaining power. This issue, known as the issue of bonding, has been hotly de-
bated over the past decade in the context of efficiency wage models but the issue
is much more general. 8Whatproportion of the rents firms can and do extract ex
ante, through low paid apprenticeship periods, deferred compensation and other
7. This criticism was fksr articulated by the editor of the NBER Macroeconomics Annual where
Blanchard and Summers was published. At the time his calls were not heeded.
8. For a discussion, see for example Dickens et al. 119891Unemployment 7
arrangements, is still an open issue. I shall take it as a given that bonding is suf-
ficiently limited and inflexible that it can be ignored in thinking about the effect
of changing labor market conditions on wages.
If appearances are not deceiving, and if wages are indeed the result of bargaining
between firms and selfish employed workers, what is then the role of unemploy-
ment in wage determination ? A number of different approaches have answered
precisely this question. The first, conducted largely at the LSE, has explored the
implications of formal collective bargaining between unions and firms .Thesec-
ond has explored models with explicit or implicit collective bargaining but with
endogenous bargaining power °.Thethird, which, no doubt under the influ-
ence of Peter Diamond, I find both convenient and revealing, has explored the
implications of one-on-one (Nash) bargaining, in models explicitly formalizing
the flows of workers and jobs, so-called search modelsThoseformalizations
differ in many ways. But, in all of them, unemployment affects bargaining through
two channels, fear arid threar
First, unemployment affects how easy it would be for employed workers to find
another job, were they to become unemployed. Thus, even if workers were to
set the wage unilaterally —as was assumed in the first generation models-, high
unemployment should in general lead them to be more careful, i.e to choose lower
wages. If wages are set in bargaining rather than unilaterally, worse prospects
in case of unemployment clearly weaken the hand of workers, decreasing the
wage. Call this the fear effect. Second, unemployment affects how easy it would
be for firms to find alternative workers, were they to replace existing workers.
Firms can threaten to turn to the unemployed. How strong and credible a threat
this is depends on how expensive this alternative would be. This will depend on
institutions, on whether for example firms can freely lay off workers, something
which is much more difficult to do in Europe than in the US. It will also vary with
labor market conditions, being cheaper in times of high unemployment, when the
unemployed are waiting at the gate. Call it the threat effect.
This makes clear that what matters in wage determination is labor market con-
ditions as perceived by the employed workers and by the firms. Is unemployment
9. Seethe survey by Nickell119891, and thebook byJackmaneta!. [19901
1O.See in particularthebook by Lindbeck and Snower 119881
11.See in particular the book by Pissarides 1 1990a]. See also Mortensen 119891 and Blanchard
and Diamond 11990a1Unemployment 8
likely to be a sufficient statistic for such market conditions ? The answer is in gen-
eral no, even when the unemployed are similar in all respects to the employed
workers (The answer is a fortiori negative when the unemployed are different
from the employed. This will be the topic of the next section). For example, in
the models that Peter Diamond and I have developed (as in the earlier work by
Diamond [1982]), the relevant labor market variable in wage determination is
not unemployment, but the present discounted value of current and anticipated
ratios of unemployment to vacancies (with a high discount rate so that only the
near future matters). With respect to some shocks, such as changes in the inten-
sity of the reallocation process, unemployment and vacancies are likely to move
in the same direction. Thus, unemployment and the ratio of unemployment to
vacancies may well move in opposite directions, and proxying labor market con-
ditions by just unemployment is likely to be misleading. With respect to shocks
in aggregate activity however, unemployment and vacancies move in opposite
directions, leading to movements in unemployment and the ratio of unemploy-
ment to vacancies in the same direction. Thus, in the model that follows, and in
which I focus on the effects of aggregate shocks, I shall ignore this complication
and assume unemployment to be the relevant market variable.
2.1 Allowing for bargaining in the earlier model
In the models I have just sketched, labor market dynamics derive from two dis-
tinct sources. First, the very costs which lead to non trivia bargaining also imply
non trivial employment dynamics given the wage. In the presence of firing costs
for example, optimizing firms must look forward when deciding whether to hire
or to fireSecond,wage bargaining itself leads to wage dynamics. Fully artic-
ulated models such as Lindbeck and Snower [19881 or Blanchard and Diamond
[1990a} allow for both sources of dynamics. In order to focus on the dynamic
implications of wage bargaining, I shall maintain here the assumption of a static
labor demand. This is clearly a short cut, but one which is useful and, I believe,
not too misleading. I believe —without, I must admit, a tightly argued case at this
stage— that, for the issue at hand, the medium run persistence of unemployment,
the dynamics coming from wage bargaining dominate those coming from search,
firing and hiring costs.
12.For a derivation of optimal labor demand under hiring and 1ring costs under the assumption
of an exogenous wage, see Berrola [1990] and Bentolila and Bertola [1990].Unemployment 9
Thus, I assume that labor demand is given as before by n =—w+ .That is, I
ignore dynamics in labor demand, and I maintain the assumption that the firm
chooses employment given the bargained wage. The change is in the determina-
tion of the wage.
Let, as before, w' be the wage such that initially employed workers, n(—1) remain
employed in expected value, thus such that : w =—n(—i).And let the wage
yielding the same utility as that of not working be w,-. This is the wage that firms
would pay, were they free to choose the wage unilaterally; were the wage less
than that, workers would stay home. Let n,. be the (logarithm of the) level of
employment which would prevail if workers were paid w, and were equal to
zero: Ti,- = _w,-. I define the unemployment rate as (n,- —n)13
Assumingthat labor market conditions for both firms and employed workers are
adequately proxied by the unemployment rate, I take the bargained wage to be:
=aw*+ (1— a)w,- —b(n,-
—En);1 > a> O;b ￿ 0 (2.1)
The wage depends on a weighted average of w, the wage which in expected value
would maintain employment at its previous level, and of w,-,thereservation wage.
In addition, it depends on expected unemployment as of the time of contracting,
(n,- —En),which affects the wage through both fear and threat effects. 14
Replacingthe wage in the labor demand relation and rearranging:
(flr— ii)= j——(n —n(—1))
— (2.2)
13.This definition oi unemployment is convenient but slightly unconventional. Defining un-
employment as the difference between a given labor force and actual employment complicates
slightly the algebra but does not affect anything of substance.
14.Compare this —postulated— relation to the wage equation derived from first principles in Blan-
chard and Diamond [1990aJ in a search model with Nash bargaining. Let upper case letters de-
note the same variables as in the text, but in levels rather than in logarithms. Let U denote un-
employment, and V denote vacancies. Then to a close approximation —i.e ignoring terms which
are quantitatively unimportant—, the wage is given by:
Z (U/V) w -z+(u/v) Z+(U/V)
where Z is the ratio of the share of the surplus of the match going to workers to the share going
to firms, a positive scalar.Unemployment 10
Unemployment follows a first order autoregressive process, with coefficient
a/(1 + b), and innovations equal to the negative of labor demand innovations.
Compare equation (2.2) and equation (1.1) derived earlier. Unless both a =1
and b =0,the model no longer delivers hysteresis. But it delivers unemployment
persistence : how much depends on how powerful employed workers are in bar-
gaining —how close a is to one—, and how weak the effects of unemployment are
on wages, —how close b is to zero.
Thus, models based on bargaining between firms and employed workers natu-
rally deliver persistence of unemployment. In their simplest form, they do not
however explain why a long period of sustained unemployment would lead to
more persistence of unemployment; in equation (2.2) above, unemployment re-
turns to equilibrium at rate a/(1 + b), regardless of its history. But these models
give a strong hint as to how they may be modified so that this happens. Suppose,
to take an extreme case, that the long term unemployed are perceived as unem-
ployable by firms. Then, after a period of prolonged aggregate unemployment, the
reemployment prospects of employed workers, were they to become unemployed,
will be much better than is suggested by measured unemployment. The pressure
of unemployment on wages will steadily decrease. A number of recent contribu-
tions have explored more sophisticated versions of this simple argument, and I
now turn to them.
3 Duration effects and persistence
Layard and Nickell [1987] were the first in the European unemployment context
to focus attention to the potential macro implications of duration effects. By du-
ration effects, I mean changes in either the skills, the motivation, or the search
behavior of the unemployed as a function of the duration of their unemployment,
or/and perceptions by firms of such differences. Those duration effects can poten-
tially account for why sustained unemployment leads to more persistence. I look
at them in turn.
3.1 Skill Deterioration and ranking
There is little doubt that prolonged unemployment decreases skills and weak-
ens work habits. Suppose that some of the long term unemployed simply becomeUnemployment 11
unemployable. This will affect the relation between unemployment and wages
in two ways. On the one hand, it will strengthen the effect of unemployment
through fear: employed workers realize —or at least should realize— that, were
they to become unemployed, they stand a chance of becoming eventually un-
employable; this leads to a stronger initial effect of unemployment on the wage.
But, on the other hand, as unemployment persists, more and more workers will
become unemployable, leading to their de facto exclusion from the labor mar-
ket, and decreasing both fear and threat factors. Thus high unemployment will
first exert substantial pressure on wages ; but the pressure will decrease as more
workers become unemployable, no longer having an effect on wage determina-
tion. This would appear to provide a simple explanation for the persistence of
unemployment in Europe in the 1980's: many workers became unemployable; al-
though they were recorded in the unemployment statistics, they were irrelevant
to the process of wage determination. But the explanation is much too simple,
and probably not of much relevance. Direct and indirect evidence simply does
not support the idea that the skill deterioration associated with unemployment
is so strong as to make many of the long term unemployed truly unemployable.
Milder forms of skill deterioration may however affect the unemployment—wage
relation in more subtle, but equally important ways. Even if skills deteriorate lit-
tle with unemployment duration, and all the unemployed remain employable,
firms which have the choice between workers of different unemployment dura-
tion, may hire first those who have been unemployed with the least time. Put
another way, they may rank workers inversely by duration of unemployment, a
phenomenon that Diamond and I have therefore called ranking. Such behav-
ior has important macro implications. By making the probability of getting a job
a decreasing function of unemployment duration, it implies that the reemploy-
ment prospects of employed workers may be quite different from those of the
currently unemployed. A high unemployment rate may then be of relatively lit-
tle concern to the currently employed who realize that their chances of finding
employment, were they to become unemployed, are much better than those of
the average unemployed worker '.Thefear effect of high unemployment may
therefore steadily weaken as unemployment persists 16Thus,ranking may help
15.The hypothesis that aggregate unemployment was of little relevance for employed workers was
first suggested by Gregory 11986] in one of the first papers on hysteresis, in that case for Australian
unemployment
16.For details and qualifications, see Blanchard and Diamond l1990a]. Related models are pre-Unemployment 12
explain the persistence of European unemployment in the 1980's: while the in-
crease in unemployment was associated with a strong deterioration of the labor
market prospects of even employed workers and thus had a strong effect on wages,
much of the effect disappeared as high unemployment persisted, and the reem-
ployment prospects of employed workers differed more and more from those who
remained unemployed.
3.2 Search Behavior, duration and state dependence
Economic theory is agnostic as to the effects of aggregate labor market conditions
or of individual unemployment duration on search behavior and search intensity.
The familiar conflict between income and substitution effects is at work : worse
chances of finding a job may lead the unemployed either to try harder, or instead
to give up. If ranking is at work, so that the probability of being hired decreases
with duration, the effect of duration on search intensity can, for the same rea-
son, go either way. Empirical evidence suggests however that, if anything, both
duration and labor market conditions affect search intensity negatively. That this
will affect the dynamic relation between wages and unemployment is obvious. But
there are again some subtle and important issues involved, which have to do with
exactly how duration affects search intensity.
Suppose that the unemployed just give up search after some time in unemploy-
ment, reorganizing their life so as to survive on the dole. The argument then
closely parallels that we used earlier in discussing skill deterioration. If the cur-
rently employed dislike the idea that they may end up adjusting to unemploy-
ment, the first effect will be to strengthen the initial effect of unemployment
through the fear factor. But the case is not as clear cut as for the loss of skills:
workers may not consider this potential endogenous change in tastes a tragedy.
The second effect is the more important one. As unemployment persists, more
and more workers give up effective search, leading to their de facto exclusion
from the labor market, and decreasing both and fear effects of unemployment.
Thus high unemployment will first exert substantial pressure on wages, but the
pressure decreases as more workers give up effective search.
Suppose instead that tastes do not change, but that when the probability of find-
ing a job falls below a critical level, the unemployed stop searching. If the proba-
senred in BaIl [19891,Pissarides11990b]Unemployment 13
bility of getting a job decreases with duration, search will stop after some duration,
the critical duration being itself a function of labor market conditions. Again, the
fear factor may lead to a stronger effect of unemployment on wages, as employed
workers now have to take into account the probability that they may give up
search. But the effect of unemployment on wages will decline as unemployment
persists. After an increase in unemployment, most workers will still be searching.
But as time passes, more and more workers will reach the critical duration and
give up search, becoming irrelevant to the process of wage determination. Put an-
other way the effect of unemployment on wages will steadily decline. The speed of
decline will itself depend on the level of unemployment. At low unemployment,
the cutoff duration will be very long, the effect of declining search intensity neg-
ligible. But at high unemployment, the cutoff duration will be much shorter, the
search intensity effects much stronger. 17•
The two mechanisms sketched above look quite similar. They are however con-
ceptually quite different and have very different dynamic implications when un-
employment decreases. The first exhibits true duration dependence; whether,
when unemployment decreases and labor market conditions improve, those
workers who had given up search start searching again is highly uncertain. The
second does not have pure duration dependence: the decision to search depends
only on labor market conditions, and duration enters only because it affects the
chances of finding a job given aggregate conditions. As unemployment decreases,
workers will start searching again, thus allowing for a decline in unemployment
without as much pressure on the wage. Thus, knowing which mechanism is at
work is crucial when thinking about how far and how fast employment can in-
crease after a long period of sustained high unemployment.
3.3 Extending the bargaining model for duration effects
The arguments I have sketched lead to dynamics which are again substantially
more complex than can be captured by any log-linear model in wages and unem-
ployment. In general, if skills or search exhibit duration dependence, the wage
17.While I have cast the argument in terms of search, the argument applies to labor mobility just
as well. The decision to move, say to a new region, depends on how likely it is to find a job in
the new region. Above some level of unemployment, there may be little incentive to move to
regions which have lower, but still high unemployment. Labor mobility decreases, decreasing the
efficiency of the matching process going on in the labor market, and increasing the equilibrium
level of unemploymentUnemployment 14
will depend on the whole distribution of unemployment durations, which itself
will depend on the whole history of unemployment 18•Butthey all point to the
idea that sustained high unemployment will have a decreasing effect on wages.
This suggests the following modification of the earlier wage equation. Let all van-
ables be the same as before. For notational economy, introduce u(n,. —n)to
denote the unemployment rate. Assume that the wage is now given by:
w =ow+ (1 —a)w.
—b(Eu
—c(L)u(—1));0 < c(1) <1 (3.1)
where c(L) is a lag polynomial of order n, with positive coefficients. 'The short
run effect of unemployment on the wage is given by b, the effect of sustained
unemployment for n periods by b(1 —c(1)).c(1) is likely to be less than one:
except for the most extreme versions of the theories I have sketched, the effect
of sustained unemployment on wages remains positive even in the long run.
When equation (3.1) is used to replace the wage in the labor demand equation,
the behavior of unemployment becomes:
u =
(.j_g)u(_1))+ u(_l) — (3.2)
There are two major differences between equation (32) and equation (2.2) which
we derived in the previous section. First, as long as c(1) > 0, the sum of the
weights on lagged unemployment is higher than before, implying higher persis-
tence. Note that duration effects do not in general generate hysteresis: this would
require both c(1) =1and a =1,and neither condition is likely to be satisfied.
Second, if c( 1) is close to one, and if c(L) is of high order, that is if the effect of
a given level of unemployment on wages decreases slowly but steadily through
time, the return to normal from a period of high sustained unemployment will be
much slower than that from a short burst in unemployment. Thus, duration mod-
els provide a potential explanation for why unemployment will decrease slowly
in an economy which has been depressed for a long time 19
18,Blanchardand Diamond 11990b1 characterize the dynamics of the distribution of unemploy-
ment durations and wages under ranking. See also Pissarides 1I990b]
19.Note that, in contrast to the equation derived in the previous section, there will be persistence
of unemployment even if a is equal to zero. Some efficiencywage models,such as Shapiro and
Stiglirz 119841 for example imply exactly that; in those models, the wage does not depend onVnemployment 15
Conclusion
I have developed a class of models based on two essential assumptions. First,
the wage is the result of bargaining between firms and employed workers, and
unemployment affects the wage only to the extent that it affects the prospects
of employed workers and of firms. Second, duration effects imply that the labor
market prospects of the unemployed may differ in systematic ways from those of
employed workers, were they to become unemployed. In the conclusion, I want to
take up briefly the next obvious question, that of how much empirical evidence
there is in support of those assumptions and of this class of models in general.
This will be little more than a glimpse, as a thorough review of the empirical
evidence would require another paper; I shall use it to indicate what I see as the
main results so far and the main outstanding questions.
Remember that this line of research was triggered by the joint behavior of infla-
tion and unemployment in Europe in the 1980's. It is therefore no great surprise
that these models fit those aggregate facts rather well... Very many wage equa-
tions, specified —more or less— along the lines of (3.2) but extended to include
in particular nominal wage setting, have been estimated for Europe and other
countries, for recent times or using longer histotical time series. Most of them
have found larger short run effects than long run effects of unemployment 2O
They have also found that short term unemployment has more effect on wages
than long term unemployment 21 But, while aggregate wage equations are useful
statistical descriptions, they are not ideal testing grounds for any theory. Their
lag structure arises not only from the factors I have focused on, but also from
the time structure of nominal wage setting, from the formation of expectations,
and from the dynamics in labor demand and so on. Disentangling the various
sources of aggregate dynamics using only aggregate data is a hopeless task. The
way to test these theories is with more disaggregated data: the models have suffi-
cient flesh and micro-detail that not only their macro implications but also their
assumptions and micro-implications can be confronted to the data.
The first crucial assumption of these models is that wages are affected by factors
within the firm. In (3.1) for example, the wage depends, among other factors, on
on conditions within the firm, but depends rather on w,. and the prospects of the currently a
employed workers, were they to become unemployed
20See Nickell [1989] and references therein
21.See Bean et al. [19861Unemployment 16
wt, the marginal product of labor of the currently employed workers, which in
turn depends both on the position of the labor demand curve and the number
of employed workers. This implication has been tested in a number of studies
using either cross section or short panel data for firms, individuals, contracts or
industries, for the US as well as the UK 22•Theresults have been nearly uniform in
finding that wages in a given firm or industry respond to firm- or industry-specific
conditions —usually measured by profit rather than the -unobservable- marginal
product w—, as well as to aggregate labor conditions. The issue in those studies
is always of whether the estimation controls for the relevant variables; while one
may quibble with each paper, the basic result appears to be quite robust. I do
not want however to give the impression here that all issues have been resolved.
Not all studies speak loudly, nor do I find all specifications satisfactory. I am also
not sure that the role of firm specific factors found in those regressions is strong
enough to generate the aggregate persistence which we observe in macro data.
In terms of equation (2.2) for example, I am not sure that the estimates of a and
b derived from the micro studies are consistent with the estimated a/(1 + b) from
macro regressions. Finally, I am not sure of how to reconcile those results with
the findings of very stable relative wage structures which have been emphasized
in the empirical research on efficiency wages (Krueger and Summers [1986] for
example).
The other crucial assumption of these models is that of duration effects. Recent
UK studies have looked at hiring practices of firms and documented that unem-
ployment is indeed often used as a ranking criterion in hiring23 Studies have also
looked at the relation between methods of search, search intensity and duration
in the UK, and have documented that active search decreases with duration .
Thesemicro studies however tell us only that the various effects are at work; they
do not tell us about their quantitative importance. One set of data which should
be of great use in the time series evidence on on unemployment by duration,
which is available for a number of European countries. Those data have been
used to document the increase in the average duration of unemployment, and in
the share of long term unemployment in total unemployment as unemployment
increased, They can in principle be used further to look at the behavior of exit
22.See for example Chrisrophides and Oswald [1990], Carruth and Oswald 11989], and other
references in Nickell 119891
23.See in particular Meager and Metcalf 119871
24.See Hughes and McCormick (1989]Unemployment 17
rates from unemployment as a function of duration and the state of the labor
market. In Blanchard and Diamond [1990c], we made a first pass at the dura-
tion data for the two countries in which unemployment has sharply decreased
in the late 1980's, the UK and Spain 25Muchbetter can surely be done. Those
aggregate data suffer however from a number of potential problems, from mea-
surement error to heterogeneity. A complementary approach is the estimation of
hazard rates using individual panel data, which also exist for a number of coun-
tries. Some existing studies (Imbens [1990] for example) have allowed hazard
rates to be a function of both individual duration and the state of the market; to
my knowledge however, none has allowed for the interactions between duration
and the state of the market which are suggested by the theories I have sketched in
the previous section. Much work, both theoretical and empirical, remains to be
done. But I am reasonably optimistic that models along the lines I have sketched
will prove useful both in reconciling micro and macro evidence and in explaining
not only the evolution of European unemployment over the last two decades, but
many of the cyclical features of labor markets in general.
25.Seealso the study by Jackman and Layard 119881Unemployment 18
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